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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
FRED K. STOCKS and BRENDA K. 
STOCKS, 
Plaintiffs - Appellants, 
vs. 
UNITED STATES FIDELITY AND 
GUARANTY COMPANY, a Corporation 
and THE TALBERT CORPORATION, a 
Corporation, 
Defendants - Appellees. 
Case No. 990624-CA 
Oral Argument Priority 15 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
RESPONSE TO STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On pages 3-4 of it brief, The Talbert Corporation asserts that Fred and Brenda 
Stocks have not personally paid the legal expenses of Timber Products but have only 
guaranteed corporate debt. Talbert gives no citation for this assertion. The record is 
to the contrary. Paragraph 19 of plaintiffs' Verified Complaint states that "plaintiffs 
have been required, at a great personal and financial sacrifice and risk to themselves, 
to undertake to provide Timber Products with the substantial financial means that have 
been and are required to enable Timber Products to defend itself against the Claims." 
In paragraph 23.a. of the Verified Complaint, Stocks further asserted that "plaintiffs 
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have foreseeably been required to make, at great personal financial sacrifice, hardship 
and risk to themselves, to undertake to provide the financial means to Timber 
Products to enable it to defend itself against the Claims . . . ." Because this case 
was decided on summary judgment, this Court is required to draw all reasonable 
inferences from the statements in the Verified Complaint and to resolve all doubts in 
favor of allowing the case to proceed to trial. Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434, 
436 (Utah 1982). 
The quoted provisions of the Verified Complaint support the inference that 
plaintiffs did not merely guarantee loans to the corporation, but personally provided 
the money necessary to defend the corporation.1 Plaintiffs' claims in this case are 
based in part on their status as personal financiers for the corporation because 
plaintiffs were required to fund the defense that defendants failed to provide. That 
plaintiffs personally funded the defense of the corporation is a reasonable inference 
from paragraphs 19 and 23.a. of the Verified Complaint, and this Court is therefore 
required to presume that plaintiffs did personally fund the defense. 
1
 Plaintiffs have in fact loaned thousands of dollars to the corporation, and the 




STOCKS' CLAIMS ARE NOT MOOT. 
USF&G argues Stocks' claims in this action are moot because the trial court 
has entered a ruling in a related action holding there was no coverage for the damages 
caused by fire. This argument should be rejected for several reasons. 
While the trial court in a related action has ruled there was no coverage, 
Timber Products still has valid claims pending in that action against both Talbert and 
USF&G for failure to provide appropriate insurance. In a ruling made February 25, 
1999, the court in that action held that there was a material issue of fact as to whether 
Talbert was an agent of USF&G. As was explained more fully in Point II of 
plaintiffs' initial brief, Talbert and USF&G owed a duty to Stocks personally to 
arrange for adequate insurance coverage for Stocks and their companies. That claim 
by Timber Products is still valid in the Timber Products case, and nothing in the trial 
court's rulings in that case would preclude Stocks from asserting that claim in this 
case. 
A second reason why the claims here are not moot is that the rulings in the 
Timber Products case are not yet final, and when final will be subject to appeal. The 
rulings in the Timber Products case would preclude litigation of similar issues in this 
3 
case only if those rulings were final. Madsen v. Borthick. 769 P.2d 245, 247 (Utah 
1988). In addition, several Utah cases hold that a ruling should not be given 
preclusive effect if an appeal is pending. DeBry v. Noble. 889 P.2d 428, 444 n.17 
(Utah 1995). USF&G's suggestion that this case is moot should be rejected. 
POINT H 
PLAINTIFFS HAVE STANDING TO PURSUE THEIR 
PERSONAL CLAIMS. 
Both USF&G and Talbert argue that a shareholder may not pursue claims for 
wrongs done to the corporation. (Talbert brief at 5, USF&G brief at 8.) Plaintiffs do 
not disagree and acknowledged in their brief that "some of the harm suffered by 
Stocks comes as a result of their stock ownership" and that such claims properly 
belong to the corporation. (Stocks brief at 14.) USF&G has focused its arguments on 
proving the conceded point that a shareholder as such cannot sue in its individual 
capacity for wrongs done to the corporation; there is no persuasive authority in its 
brief to show that Stocks do not have standing to sue for the wrongs to them 
personally, which are separate and distinct from their injuries as shareholders. 
Both parties have cited to the Utah Court of Appeals decision in DLB 
Collection Trust v. Harris. 893 P.2d 593 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). The court in that 
case relied on the rationale of the Colorado Court of Appeals in Nicholson v. Ash. 
800 P.2d 1352 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990). As in DLB, the plaintiff in Nicholson was a 
4 
bank shareholder who claimed tliat the mismanagement of other shareholi 
to the demise of the bank, imarv issue in Nicholson was wl .-ihri the other 
shareholders s Nicholson a InUK'UM> o , ^ •' I - ,,f acknow iiMi'ed that the 
.shareholders might owe him a liduua. • •».« shareholders, tiiev mil no. we him a 
fiduciary duty as a guarantor; 
As the trial court recognized, plaintiffs agreement lo 
guarantee certain debts did not enhance his status as a 
stockholder. Rather, that action resulted in plaintiff having 
two relationships with the corporation-one created by his 
purchase of stock and one resulting from his guarantee of 
the debt. 
As a stockholder, the directors owed to plaintiff 
various fiduciary obligations. These same obligations, 
however, are not owed to guarantors or other corporate 
creditors. 
Further, the damage suffered by plaintiff, which he 
claims is unique, was suffered as a result of his loan 
guaranty and the corporations* failure to fulfill their implied 
obligation to indemnify him from any loss thereunder. By 
reason of such failure of indemnification, plaintiff sustained 
a creditor's loss; this loss was unassociated with plaintiffs 
status as a stockholder. 
Nicholson. 800 P.2d at 135'/ luirt.vin >-J 
In other words, Nicholson actually supports the concept tliat an individual may 
wear various hats with respect lo a corpora:- f* .-.>urt musf analyze each 
relationship separately ^ V Uu : -oi Slocks happen 10 be sharehoi,;,; .*. -
they automatically lack v .f"hnp to sue for individual wrongs - '- * -*? n iheir capa 
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as financiers. Nicholson recognized that "if the stockholder is a party to a contract, 
whether express or implied, with the directors or some other third party, he may 
maintain a personal suit against that third party. However, in such cases the status of 
stockholder is of no importance, since he sued in his individual capacity." Nicholson, 
800 P.2d at 1356 (citations and quotation marks omitted, italics in original). 
The statements in Nicholson are consistent with the recent opinion of the Utah 
Supreme Court in Aurora Credit Services, Inc. v. Liberty West Development, Inc., 
970 P.2d 1273 (Utah 1998). The Court there gave examples of derivative suits by 
shareholders and then compared direct actions by shareholders: 
If the injury is one to the plaintiff as a stockholder and to 
him individually, and not to the corporation, as where the 
action is based on contract to which he is a party, or on a 
right belonging severally to him, or on a fraud affecting 
him directly, it is an individual action. 
Put differently, in a direct action, the plaintiff can prevail 
without showing an injury to the corporation-the 
shareholder need show only an injury to him- or herself 
that is distinct from that suffered by the corporation. 
970 P.2d at 1280 (quotation marks, brackets, and citations omitted). 
Fred and Brenda Stocks are shareholders in Timber Products, but their claims 
do not arise out of that status. Stocks personally met with Talbert (USF&G's agent) 
and asked Talbert to provide appropriate insurance for Stocks and their companies. 
Stocks are a named insured on the insurance ultimately provided. Stocks therefore 
have a claim against Talbert and USF&G for breach of Talbert's duty to provide 
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appropriate insurance for Stocks' companies. Stocks also personally funded the legal 
defense. Finally, Stocks personally suffered the loss of peace of mind and other 
emotional, but very real, injuries resulting from the defendants' failure to provide 
adequate insurance. 
None of the cases cited by Talbert or USF&G address this type of situation, 
nor are they persuasive on whether Talbert or USF&G is liable to Stocks for breach 
of duty. Jordan v. United States Fidelity and Guarantee Company. 843 F. Supp. 164 
(S.D. Miss. 1993), cited on pages 11-12 of USF&G's brief, involved only the issue of 
whether a stockholder as such can sue for emotional injuries resulting from the 
insurer's failure to defend. The case is inapplicable because Stocks are not suing as 
shareholders. 
The dictum in Herzing v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.. 907 S.W.2d 574, 
585 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995), cited by USF&G at page 13 of its brief, is not persuasive 
in this case. The plaintiffs there claimed personal involvement because they had paid 
a brokerage fee to obtain a loan for their corporation. It does not appear from the 
opinion that the individuals were seeking recovery of the brokerage fee, but only for 
their emotional injuries because the corporations did not receive the loans. That is 
very different from this case, where Stocks are seeking to recover the thousands of 
dollars they have been required to pay to mount a defense for the corporation. 
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The emotional injury issue is also distinguishable because the very purpose of 
purchasing insurance is to provide peace of mind. Beck v. Farmers Insurance 
Exchange, 701 P.2d 795, 802 (Utah 1985). Stocks employed Talbert to provide 
appropriate insurance for Stocks' corporations, one of the purposes of which was to 
provide peace of mind to Stocks. Because the purpose of the insurance was to provide 
peace of mind, this is distinguishable from Herzing. where there was no claim that the 
loans were sought to obtain peace of mind. 
Similarly, in Maryland Staffing Services. Inc. v. Manpower. Inc.. 936 F. Supp. 
1494 (E.D. Wis. 1996), the plaintiffs alleged claims arising away from their status as 
shareholders. There were no allegations that the individual plaintiffs had a status 
other than shareholders. 
The statement in Hammes v. Aamco Transmissions. Inc.. 33 F.3d 774, 777 
(7th Cir. 1994), is also dictum, but the individuals in that case were permitted to sue 
for wrongs to the corporation, the court holding the defendants had waived the 
defense. 33 F.3d at 778. 
In the instant case, contrary to all the cases cited by defendants, Fred and 
Brenda Stocks suffered damages arising from the fact that they personally contracted 
with the insurance agent to provide insurance other companies, and from the fact that 
they were required to personally finance the defense for the corporation when the 
insurance company failed to do so. These are not injuries arising from their status as 
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stockholders, but rather from their independent contract with the insurance company. 
They have standing to pursue those personal claims. 
Talbert also asserts the puzzling claim that "a plaintiff cannot recover for 
negligent infliction of emotional distress arising from breach of contract." (Talbert's 
brief at 8.) Talbert then launches into a discussion of the rules under which a 
bystander witness to a tort can recover for the bystander's emotional injuries. The 
discussion is completely inapposite. Talbert's claims are not based on having 
witnessed a breach of contract, but rather arise from breach of Talbert's duty, owed 
directly to Stocks, to provide adequate insurance for Stocks and their companies. As 
explained in Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange. 701 P.2d 795, 802 (Utah 1985), 
"[a]n insured frequently faces catastrophic consequences if funds are not available with 
a reasonable period of time to cover an insured loss." Beck further held that "we find 
no difficulty with the proposition that, in unusual cases, damages for mental anguish 
might be provable." Id. Plaintiffs' have suffered such damages in this case and are 
entitled to recover for the emotional injury caused by defendant's failure to provide 
adequate insurance. 
CONCLUSION 
Stocks' damages are personal to them, and arise from their undertaking to 
defendant the corporation when defendants' failed to do so, and from the defendants' 
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breach of their duty, owed to Stocks personally, to obtain adequate insurance for 
Stocks' companies. Stocks have standing to pursue these personal claims. 
This Court should reverse the trial court's dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint, 
and remand this case for trial on the merits. 
DATED this ^ day of March, 2000. 
LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants 
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